Truths is not a genuine property shared by all true propositions
This view is expressed by the deflationary theory of truth.
This view is expressed by the deflationary theory of truth.
There are truths in many different domains: common sense truths about everyday objects, scientific truths, moral truths, mathematical truths, truths about metaphysics... In these domains, we deal with different kinds of things, and the procedures for establishing what's true and false are different. Given this variety, we might be suspicious of the idea that there is some property of truth that unifies all these truths, and explains what makes them true.
Many philosophers are suspicious that we can cash out mathematical truths[1] or moral truths[2] in terms of correspondence to the world. Deflationists don't have to worry about this, because they don’t require some property that all of these different truths would share.[3]
Logical laws do not correspond to facts. Truth is correspondence to facts. No. Retrieved November 1, 2024. ↩︎
Moral truths do not correspond to facts. Truth is correspondence to facts. No. Retrieved November 1, 2024. ↩︎
Deflationary Theories of Truth. Retrieved November 1, 2024. ↩︎
Truth theories like the correspondence theory rely on vague metaphysical concepts, like correspondence relations[1], which is problematic for metaphysics-skeptical philosophers, such as empiricists or pragmatists.
Deflationist theories, however, avoid metaphysics. Ask a deflationist why “snow is white” is true, and they’ll simply show you: look at a photo, or glance out the window -- it’s white![2]
No access problem. Truth is correspondence to facts. No. Retrieved November 1, 2024. ↩︎
Deflationary Theories of Truth. Retrieved November 1, 2024. ↩︎
Gottlob Frege in his essay "Thought: A Logical Inquiry"[1] has presented the following argument in favor deflationism:
in a definition certain characteristics would have to be stated. And in application to any particular case the question would always arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present. So one goes round in a circle. Consequently, it is probable that the content of the word "true" is unique and indefinable.
Frege’s point seems to be that there is no way to define truth in terms of other conditions. If we were to ask whether those other conditions are satisfied for any truth proposition, the answer will only work if it is true that those other conditions are satisfied. So we end up just continuously going round in a circle or perhaps falling into an infinite regress. Thus we are unable to eliminate truth in favor of some other conditions[2].
Frege, G., 1918. "Thought", in his Logical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1977 ↩︎
Deflationary Theories of Truth. Retrieved November 1, 2024. ↩︎