There is no independent way the world is

The correspondence theory of truth states that: a proposition "P" is true in case it corresponds to the world. But according to Nelson Goodman, we make the worlds^[1]. For example, we adopt different frameworks for carving out different objects.

What is it for a proposition to "match the world"? For example, when we say "the table is flat". If we take this proposition to be true, it seems that it is going to rest at least partially on what our standards are for what counts as a relevant match. For instance, it could be flat enough so that we can place objects on it without them falling off or wobbling. On the other hand, if one was conducting a precision experiment in physics, then it is not really clear if we want to say that the table is flat.

In the traditional correspondence theory the thought is that there is an objective fact of the matter whether proposition corresponds to the world. There is an independent way the world is and there is this objective matching relation. Relativists can target both of those claims, they can deny that there is an independent way the world is, and show that the matching relation is dependent on our perspective.^[2]

The coherence theory of truth entails relativism.^[1]

Relativism is self-refuting only from the absolutists' perspective of truth, but not relativists'

There is an argument to be made that relativism is self-refuting:

If it is relatively true, then there are two problems. First, it is false for absolutists. Hence, relativism is absolutely false. Again, self-refuting.

This is only a problem if you assume an absolutist account of truth. The relativist does not assert the contradiction that relativism is true and relativism is false.

She simply asserts that relativism is true – and that this, like all truths, is relative to her perspective. She can acknowledge the existence of other perspectives, without asserting the content of those perspectives.^[1]

Inability to deny absolutism is not necessarily self-undermining

There is an argument to be made that relativism is self-undermining:

the relativist has conceded that the absolutist is correct, from the absolutist’s own perspective. The relativist can give the absolutist no reason to give up her position; in this way, relativism is self-undermining.

Consider trivialism, the position that all propositions are true. Just as the relativist supposedly cannot deny absolutism, so it is not possible for anybody to deny trivialism. This is because any assertion you make will be part of the content of trivialism.

Most would agree that trivialism is not a reasonable position to hold. Yet it is impossible to deny it. Thus, just because you can’t deny somebody's position, that doesn’t mean you are self-undermining.^[1]

Anything that absolutist says can be "encircled and enfolded" by a relativist

There is an argument to be made that relativism is self-undermining:

the relativist has conceded that the absolutist is correct, from the absolutist’s own perspective. The relativist can give the absolutist no reason to give up her position; in this way, relativism is self-undermining.

Robert Nozick argues that from the relativist's point of view, it is the absolutist who has trouble denying her opponent's position. The absolutist says:

(A) There is an absolute truth.

The relativist responds: "(A) is true for you, but not for me." So the absolutist has not yet said anything to trouble the relativist. The absolutist strengthens her claim:

(A2) There is an absolute truth, and it is true for everyone.

To which the relativist replies: "(A2) is true for you but not for me."

The absolutist could try to catch up with the relativist by defining A∞. However, the relativist can just refer to it and state that "A∞ is true for you, but not for me".

Anything the absolutist says can be "encircled and enfolded" by the relativist. By contrast, the relativist says:

(R) All truths are relative.

To which the absolutist responds:

(F) (R) is false, absolutely false.

Now the relativist again says, "(F) is true for you but not for me", and the previous game starts again.

There is asymmetry here. The absolutist's claim can be "enfolded" by the relativist. By contrast, while the relativist's claim can be denied by the absolutist, it cannot be enfolded by the absolutist.

From the relativist's point of view, the absolutist does not deny relativism, because the absolutist gets enfolded. From the absolutist's point of view, the relativist does deny absolutism.^[1]